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Lord Huxtable of Pen-y-bont ar Ogwr 

[1] I agree with my noble and learned friends that this appeal must be dismissed for the reasons given. I will, however, venture to add some remarks about our role in this appeal. Given the recent frequency with which we have been required to adjudicate on these matters of life and death, I feel it appropriate also to add my reflections on how we might see the law in this area developing. I do so in the manner of Lady Hale, Lord Kerr and Lord Coggon; my observations, however, differ markedly from theirs. 

[2] Our task in this – and, indeed, every – appeal case is to apply the law. On the occasion of the final sitting of the House of Lords in its judicial capacity, Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury explained: “‘As judges, we are concerned with applying the law, not with changing the law: that is a matter to be decided by Parliament”’ (R (Purdy) v DPP [2009] 3 WLR 403, 409). In the same hearing, Lord Hope of Craighead elaborated in the following terms: “‘Our function as judges is to say what the law is and, if it is uncertain, to do what we can to clarify it”’ (ibidibid, 385). 

[3] Law, as my noble friend avers, requires clarity. The esteemed jurist Lon Fuller described the essence of law as “‘subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules”’ (The Morality of Law, (revised edn, 1969, New Haven,: Yale University Press, 1969, 96)). If law is to succeed in its goal, explained Professor Fuller, the rules and their practical applications must meet various criteria, such as those requiring clarity, certainty and consistency; criteria which, I note, have been cited with approval in the Court of Appeal by Arden LJ (FP (Iran) v Secretary of State for the Home Department; MP (Libya) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] EWCA Civ 13, [para 74]). 

[4] In one sense, the law governing assistance in dying is already clear. The lawIt advances a fundamentally prohibitive proposition: there is no right to be assisted to die, whether by one’s own final actions or by those of another, and so to assist will involve the commission of a criminal offence (R (on the application of Pretty) v DPP [2002] 1 AC 800; Purdy, ibidibid). 

[5] We have, however, had the opportunity to clarify the law as it pertains to the prosecution of such an alleged offence, specifically by requiring the Director of Public Prosecutions to clarify the guidance to Crown Prosecutors regarding the prosecution of complicity in suicide (Purdy, ibidibid). Such clarification was necessary in order to ensure law’s proper functioning as law i.e. as a body of rules by which people’s behaviour can be guided. Our decision on that occasion accordingly clarified the manner in which the rules would be applied. 

[6] Our decision achieved more than this, however. In so ruling, we were able to satisfy the dictates of justice. People do, of course, disagree about what justice requires whenever the difficult dilemmas presented by assisted dying arise. The law, for its part, will seek to do justice as the case requires and may even, where necessary, modify its principles, provided that its rules remain clear. According to Lord Brandon of Oakbrook, “‘[t]The common law … while generally immutable in its principles, unless different principles are laid down by statute, is not immutable in the way in which it adapts, develops and applies those principles in a radically changing world and against the background of radically changed social conventions and conditions"’ (R v D [1984] AC 778, 804-805). As Lord Reed has noted with approval, Professor Fuller similarly believed that the law must be prepared to change with the times (AXA General Insurance Ltd and others v HM Advocate and others [2012] 1 AC 868, 935B). 

[7] Sometimes, of course, only Parliament can take the necessary step in changing the rules, after thorough consideration of each of the relevant factors. Pending such a step, however, there remains a role for the court. As Lord Scarman once recognised, “‘[u]Unless and until Parliament should think fit to intervene, the courts should establish a principle flexible enough to enable justice to be achieved by its application to the particular circumstances proved by the evidence placed before them”’ (Gillick v West Norfolk AHA [1986] 1 AC 112, 186C). 

[8] Law must, therefore, be both clear and just, and sometimes justice will require flexibility. As I have indicated, these elements came together in our decision requiring the elaboration of distinct guidance for the prosecution of complicity in suicide. Few would say that the paradigmatic case of assistance in suicide – in which a loved one provides aid to a suffering individual at that individual’s explicit request – is a situation in which the assistant should expect to endure the full force of the criminal law. The resultant policy has, I note, been applied leniently, particularly whenever relatives have helped their loved ones to travel to Zurich, so that they may take up the offer of assistance in suicide which is available there. We see, in this compassionate prosecutorial policy, justice at work. 

[9] Perhaps, however, the policy still lacks the requisite clarity. It is in the nature of such guidance to prosecutors that the relevant factors will only be listed, without any particular weight necessarily being assigned to any particular factor. Clarifying the weighting could better inform citizens about how the rules will be applied. But here we reach the limits of the courts’ function. Such a radical change in the rules would necessitate Parliamentary intervention. Only Parliament could properly assess the relevant features and, indeed, the likely wider ramifications of such a proposal for prosecution policy more broadly. As Lord Scarman has indicated, the court is confined “‘by the forensic process to the evidence adduced by the parties and to whatever may properly fall within the judicial notice of judges”’ (Gillick, ibidibid, 186C). 

[10] Having said all this, we know that Parliament remains disinclined to legislate in favour of assisted dying. Is there, then, more that the courts can do to ensure that the law in this area is clear and just? Precedent reveals that our brethren and sistren are not afflicted by timidity, when justice requires a bold stand. We have, for example, found legal support for the surgical separation of conjoined twins, even where this will result in the death of one sibling, and we have also authorised the withdrawal of life-supporting treatment from a permanently incapacitated individual (Re A (children)(conjoined twins: surgical separation) [2000] 4 All ER 961; Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] 2 WLR 816). As Lord Fraser remarked in another landmark decision, “‘[s]Social customs change, and the law ought to, and does in fact, have regard to such changes when they are of major importance”’ (Gillick, ibidibid, 171E). In that decision, as in those others just mentioned, a defence was therefore found, which there enabled a medical practitioner to issue advice and treatment to a competent, consenting minor, without fear of legal redress. 

[11] Perhaps bolder still are those occasions, albeit rare, on which we have found to be criminal an action which offends against justice. On occasion, justice requires us to increase the exceptions to a general rule. “‘This is a legitimate use of the flexibility of the common law which can and should adapt itself to changing social attitudes”’, Lord Lane CJ once suggested, adding: “‘There comes a time when the changes are so great that it is no longer enough to create further exceptions restricting the effect of the proposition, a time when the proposition itself requires examination to see whether its terms are in accord with what is generally regarded today as acceptable behaviour”’ (R v R [1991] 1 AC 599, 610D). In that case, our learned colleagues found that there was no longer a rule of law by which a wife was deemed to have consented to sexual intercourse with her spouse; the corollary was, therefore, that a husband could be found guilty of rape or its attempt. 

[12] The latter decision did, however, attract criticism, including from the venerable Professor John C Smith (“‘Rape: Whether defence that complainant and defendant married (Case Comment)”’, Crim LR 1992; 207). Professor Smith’s objection was itself founded on the idea of the rule of law, with which Professor Fuller had been similarly concerned. Professor Smith suggested that the House had extended the law, thereby usurping Parliament’s function, and had done so at a time when Parliament was preparing to address the matter, following recommendations formulated by the Law Commission (Criminal Law: Rape within Marriage, (Law Com. No. 205, 1992, London: HMSO, Law Com. No. 205, 1992)). The House, nevertheless, sought to give effect to the dictates of justice. Times had changed and the law had to be brought in line with the moral inclinations of right thinking persons. 

[13] What bearing has any of this on the present appeal? There are certainly some important differences, to which we must be alert. The situation before us, unlike that which confronted the House in 1992, is one on which right thinking persons do not agree. As Lord Hope recognises, recent debates in the Parliamentary chambers about the merits and demerits of assisted dying leave us in no “‘doubt as to the strength of feeling on either side”’ (Purdy, ibidibid, 385). We would be wise to view with caution the results of some unofficial commissions that have examined the issues, such as the recent Commission on Assisted Dying (The current legal status of assisted dying is inadequate and incoherent..., (2011, London, : Demos, 2011)). We should, however, be mindful that Parliamentarians have twice in recent years undertaken their own, very thorough, explorations (House of Lords Select Committee, Report of the Select Committee on Medical Ethics (HMSO, HL Paper 21, 1994), London: HMSO; House of Lords Select Committee, Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill [HL], Volume I – Report, (HMSO, HL Paper 86-I, 2005), London: HMSO). On neither occasion did the Select Committee favour a permissive change in the law. Nor, lest we forget, have the Parliamentary chambers voted in favour of changing the rules in the ways proposed by Lord Joffe, in his Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill, which was rejected in 2006, or, more recently, by Lord Falconer, in his Assisted Dying Bill of 2013. 

[14] Parliament’s reluctance appears to stem from the strength of the arguments against any move towards allowing assisted dying on request. We ourselves have had cause to visit the relevant objections, both principled and pragmatic. We are, therefore, bound to honour the principle of the sanctity of human life, which, according to Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough, “‘is probably the most fundamental of the human social values”’ (Pretty, ibidibid, 848D). So too have we encountered concerns about the need to protect the vulnerable, preserve patients’ trust in their physicians, and avoid any step onto a dangerous “‘slippery slope”’ (Pretty, ibidibid, 831D, per Lord Steyn). But weighed against the foregoing concerns are calls to relieve the suffering of patients, coupled with appeals to the principle of respect for patient autonomy, which is elsewhere writ large in the law (Pretty, ibidibid, 831B, per Lord Steyn). If an individual like Mr Lamb or, previously, Mr Nicklinson wants assistance in escaping an unwanted life of suffering, why should that wish be denied? 

[15] In short, this may be a court of law, but it is also a court of morals. As the occasion requires, we are alert to the moral dimensions of the case at hand. Unfortunately, where assisted dying is concerned, we find that the morals of the matter are murky and muddled. Sometimes matters are made worse, when a single idea is forced to bear two entirely opposing interpretations, such as when appeals are made to “‘dignity”’ both by those in favour of, and by those opposed to, assistance in dying (D. Beyleveld and R. Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw, 2001, (Oxford,: Oxford University Press, 2001);; J. Keown, Euthanasia, Ethics and Public Policy: An Argument Against Legalisation (, 2002, Cambridge,: Cambridge University Press, 2001, 40)). Yet, whichever terms are employed, there are evidently powerful arguments on either side. 

[16] So what does and should the law do? For my part, I believe the law is currently alert to the competing sets of concerns just outlined. Prohibitive arguments such as those premised on the sanctity of life find support in the law of homicide, as well as in the legal endorsement of various distinctions, including the distinction between actions that end life (which are prohibited) and omissions that end life (which may be permitted, subject to certain criteria being satisfied). Permissive arguments, such as those premised on appeals to mercy and autonomy, meanwhile, find support in those rulings which afford a competent adult the right to refuse even life-saving treatment, as well as in those which recognise when the limits of treating a life of poor quality have been reached. Of course, these examples do not directly tackle the contested case, with which we are concerned, in which an individual seeks positive assistance in dying. But, in these cases too, we see the law’s ability to attend to concerns on both sides: assistants might expect a measure of leniency from the law-as-applied, but the law-as-stated leaves the prosecutor free to proceed, where the circumstances seem to require this. 

[17] The law therefore conveys a compromise, attending simultaneously to different sets of scruples. I think this appropriately captures the justice of this specific situation, on which right thinking persons can and do disagree. But do the relevant rules, and their associated practices, measure up to Professor Fuller’s demands for clarity? Here, I suspect, more can be done. 

[18] There are, I believe, two options, either of which could enhance the clarity of the rules governing assistance in dying. One option, to which I earlier referred, would involve a more explicit weighting of the factors for and against prosecution. The second option is bolder still, since this would involve the creation of an explicit offence of assistance in dying, which could also be made available as a partial defence to any other homicide charge. 

[19] The idea of creating a distinct offence of this sort is not new, having been explored by various respectable committees (Royal Commission, Royal Commission on Capital Punishment 1949-1953: Report, (HMSO, Cmnd 8932, 1953) London: HMSO, 63-64; Criminal Law Revision Committee, Working Paper on Offences against the Person, 1976, London:( HMSO), 31-34; House of Lords Select Committee, Report of the Select Committee on Murder and Life Imprisonment, H.L. 78 I-III, (HMSO, HL 78 I-III, 1989)), London: HMSO). The Law Commission more recently revived the idea, when it provisionally proposed that so-called “‘mercy killings”’ be brought explicitly within the purview of manslaughter by virtue of diminished responsibility (Law Commission, A New Homicide Act for England and Wales? A Consultation Paper, (Law Com Consultation Paper No 177, 2005), London: Law Commission, 215). That proposal was, however, withdrawn (Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide. Project 6 of the Ninth Programme of Law Reform: Homicide, (Law Com No 304, 2006),  London: Law Commission, 145-155), and perhaps wisely so, given doubts expressed by one of my former learned colleagues about whether such a defendant can properly be considered to be acting with diminished responsibility (Lawton LJ, “‘Mercy Killing: The Judicial Dilemma”’, (1979) 72 Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine 1979;, 72: 460-461). Alternative models for the type of offence I have in mind may yet become available; we lack a blueprint at present, but scholarly defences of the basic idea, and its essential components, are emerging (R. Huxtable, Euthanasia, Ethics and the Law: From Conflict to Compromise (, 2007, London,: Routledge-Cavendish, 2007); H. Keating and J. Bridgeman, “‘Compassionate Killings: The Case for a Partial Defence”’, (2012) Mod Law Rev 2012; 75(5) MLR : 697–721). 

[20] I therefore suspect that more can be done to clarify the contours of the middle ground in which we all, as citizens, seek to navigate. There appear to be two options, either of which would enhance the clarity of the relevant rules. I have acknowledged how the court has a role to play in providing such clarification, especially where such clarification aligns with the interests of justice. As I have demonstrated, there have been other situations in which my brethren and sistren have felt able to achieve justice in the instant case by advancing a particular reading of the relevant rules. I doubt, however, that I can do more, in the present appeal, than offer these remarks as to how the law might be honed. If I were to go further today I believe this would involve trespassing on Parliament’s territory. Of course, on this fundamental matter, if on so few others, Lord Coggon and I disagree, since he envisages no such impediment. 

[21] For my part, I would hope that, when next it is asked to consider such matters, Parliament will give thought to clarifying the compromise. Professor Mitchell’s research for the Law Commission revealed a measure of public support for such a move (Law Commission, 2006, ibidaboveibid, 148-149). Notably, most of the respondents felt that police investigation was warranted and, where this resulted in prosecution and conviction, “‘a community-based disposal, with the emphasis on counselling for the killer, would be appropriate”’ (ibidibid, 149). That, to my mind, demonstrates due regard for the competing conceptions of justice available in these difficult cases. 

[22] Whether Parliament will be inclined to take the route I have sign-posted remains to be seen. But Parliament’s job this must be. As Lord Mustill once so accurately stated: “‘The formulation of the necessary broad social and moral policy is an enterprise which the courts have neither the means nor in my opinion the right to perform. This can only be achieved by democratic process through the medium of Parliament”’ (Bland, ibidaboveibid, 890). As such, for the reasons given, I would dismiss the present appeal, although I would urge Parliament to consider again how best to clarify the rules governing assisted dying, in a manner which does justice to the arguments on both sides. 
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